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CASE NOTE
LIABILITY FOR COST OF LITIGATION THAT ACCRUE AFTER LITIGATION IS COMPLETE:
COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH ESTABLISHED CONSENT
DECREE'S ARE PART OF LITIGATION COSTS
Sierra Club v. Hankinsoni
1. INTRODUCTION

The Clean Water Act 2 ("CWA") was designed by congress and is interpreted by the courts, in ways most
favorable to ensuring the tranquility of America's waterways. In the instant case, Sierra Club v. Hankinson, the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed a district court decision assigning litigation cost liability to the losing party. The
district court considered part of prevailing party's litigation costs to be the cost of the plaintiff monitoring the
bodies of water afier the consent decree was put into effect. These costs, which are not technically part of the
litigation. arose after litigation in the instant case occurred. Therefore, the defendant claimed that he was not
liable for such post monitoring costs since litigation was completed when the consent decree was effectuated.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

In Hankinson. -Georgia ignored its obligation to produce a [Water Quality Limited Segment ("WQLS")]

list for thirteen years after the 1979 statutory deadline for submission." 3 The state finally produced apartial list
of WQLS in 1992. but two years later, it still had not adequately complied with the requirements of the CWA.4
As a result. the Sierra Club and other environmental organizations filed suit under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) in an
attempt to force the EPA to update the WQLS list and issue Total Maximum Daily Loads ("TMDLs") because
of Georgia's non-compliance with the Act.5 The district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs; 6
and the court -ordered the EPA to issue complete TMDLs on a relatively strict five-year schedule."' The EPA
appealed the summary judgment. and while the appeal was pending, it entered into a consent decree with the
Sierra Club "requiring that the EPA review and update Georgia's WQLS list.',8 During the next year, the same
parties signed another consent decree. this time in regard to a timetable for the EPA to establish TMDLs for
each body of water on Georgia's WQLS list.) This list was to be updated biannually by the EPA beginning on
October 16. 1997.1(o
The EPA's first list of TMDLs for 124 WQLSs was submitted at the same time as the second consent
decree.'' However. two years later Georgia still had not incorporated this list into its water management plan,

351 F.3d 1358 (1 Ith Cir. 2003).
33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
Sierra Club 351 F.3d 1358 at 1360.
4 Id.
Id. (citing Sierra Club v. Hankinson. 939 F. Supp. 872. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1996)).
6 Id. (citing Hankinson. 939 F. Supp.
at 873).
Id. (citing Hankinson. 939 F. Supp. at 873).
8 Id.
Id.

o Id.

11Id.
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"and neither . .. [Georgia] nor the EPA had moved to implement them in other ways." 2 The Sierra Club then
filed a motion requesting the district court reopen the second consent decree in order to compel cooperation.13
The state of Georgia promised the Sierra Club that it would '-develop implementation plans within nine
months."' 4 Georgia did produce these plans within a satisfactory amount of time, and at that time the EPA
requested the district court dismiss the Sierra Club's motion as moot. 1 5 The district court denied the motion and
ruled that the implementation plans formed part of the consent decree, and that the EPA therefore had an
obligation to assure that the plans were adequate." '" Previously. in Sierra Club v. Meiburg,17 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected the district court's interpretation holding that the plan "did
not fall within the terms of the Isecond] consent decree."1'
The Sierra Club then requested the court of appeals award it litigation costs and "attorneys' fees under
33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) for its work in monitoring EPA compliance with the consent decree." 1 9 The district court
denied the requests for all fees relating to TMDL implementation. time spent on redundant work, general
background research. unsuccessful motions. and certain litigation issues: then it awarded $139,963.57 to the
plaintiffs. w\hich included the S30.425.61 fee of non-testifying expert witness Barry Sulkin.2 ' The EPA then
appealed from this decision to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.22
On appeal. the EPA first argued that the fees awarded were for work that was beyond the scope
reasonably necessary to monitor compliance with the consent decree.- The EPA claimed that Meiburg only
required the Agency to establish TMDLs in some form. 4 The EPA argued that the plaintiffs could "recover the
costs necessary to determine iwhether the agency promulgated standards." but there was no requirement to
inspect the standards in an\ detail.> The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. pointing out that its holding in Meiburg
-simply noted that implementation plans \\ere not mentioned within the definition of TMDL . . . EPA

obligations. or anyw\here w\ithin the consent decree.> 6 The consent decree in the instant case required that
"each stage of [MDL proposals by the EPA relate[] to a new WQLS list promulgated by the state of Georgia,
making re\ ie\ of the underlving WQLS lists essential to monitoring the TMDLs themselves." 27 The Eleventh
Circuit aureed \ith the district court's decision that the "examination of the content of the TMDLs, WQLS lists
and 1PPAs '-as necessarx to meanineful enforcement of the Consent Decree. '
Additionally, the court of
appealS used the relevanc\ standard set in Brooks v. Georgia State Board of Elections, to hold that the

i.

N.

1

r

7
1(,1.

t

1.

Id.

Id/. --In fact. the decree expliciti1l states the E:PA dosnot obligate itself to perform. or ensure the performance of the incorporation
of TMNDLs into fture GJeorgia EPIA Performance Partnership Agreements." Id.

Id. at 1362.
Id. (citinu Order at 7).

judgment
terms of the judgment.

997 F.2d 8.7. 864 ( I Ith Cir. 191). Following Brooks. the court held that post

relevnt to the rihts' eptablished h\ tr the ce 'd*e not
Brmks. 997

F.2d at 864).
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e Club. 351 F.3d at 1362 (citing
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information in the consent decree appeared "relevant to those rights established b\ the decree and related to
terms of the judgment."30
The EPA's second argument focused on the plaintiffs' right to challenge TMDLs in the future under the
consent decree.3 ' The EPA reasoned that this right implied that the consent decree only covered the existence
of TMDLs, not the TMDLs compliance with applicable laws.32 It argued that challenges to TMDLs in the
future would require distinct issues and "new administrative records" in that any such claims would be separate
from the rights granted in the consent decree.33 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that if the plaintiffs had
discovered inadequate standards, they could have returned to the district court on motion for enforcement of the
consent decree standards. 34 This was allowable because the consent decree gave the court jurisdiction to issue
orders "necessary or appropriate to construe. implement. modify. or enforce" the consent decree."
Finally, the EPA argued the fee-shifting provision of the consent decree did not cover the cost of a nontestifying expert witness.36 The district court awarded such fees payable by the EPA to the non-testifying expert
witness Barry Sulkin because the litigation "had been especially complex and that he had *helped plaintiffs
prevail.'" 3 7 The EPA claimed Sulkin could not have helped plaintiffs -prevail' since he only helped monitor
the established consent decree.3 8 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument based on policy announced in
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council.39 where the Supreme Court held that *Congress enacted the
fee-shifting provision in order to 'encourage citizen participation in the enforcement of standards and
regulations established under [the Clean Air] Act.'4" The Eleventh Circuit previously recognized that
Delaware Valley "employed a pragmatic test over a technical one in construing the attorney's fees statute."4 1 In
that case, the Supreme Court was more concerned with the measures to secure the rights delineated in the
consent decree than the "technical definition of 'litigation costs.- 4 Based on this reasoning. the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's award of fees for the non-testifying expert Witness used after litigation had
been completed. 43

30

Sierra Club. 351 F.3d at 1362.

31Id.
3 Id.
"34Id.
Id.
35id.

36id.
37Id.

38 Id.

478 U.S. 546 (1986).

40See Sierra Club. 351 F.3d at 1363 (quoting S.
Ri P. No. 91-1196 (1970).

4'
42 Id.

id.
4 Id.

at 1364 (citing Brooks v. Ga. State Bd. of Elections. 997 F.2d 857. 863
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Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Water Act44

The development of the Clean Water Act began in 1890 and was named the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1890.45 The original Act only affected New York Harbor, and only applied to waste that would interfere with
navigability. 46 The Act was amended in 1899 to grant power to the Secretary of the Army to issueermits for
discharging waste into navigable waters, regardless of whether the waste would impede navigability.
In 1912, concern over pollution in lakes and streams began to arise, and the Public Health Service was
given the power to investigate possible health effects of such pollution. 48 However, the Public Health Service
was not given any power to alleviate pollution. 49 Despite Congress's realization of the dangers of water
pollution, and attempts to pass bills geared toward national regulations of water pollution it was unable to
accomplish anything in the 1930's. In 1948 Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (also
known as the Clean Water Act).:o One of the purposes of the Act was to -'bolster local pollution control
programs with technical services and money."'
In 1965, the Act was amended to give the federal government more power by permitting it to regulate
water quality standards for interstate waters. 52 This version of the Act was still considered ineffective due to
"its limited scope and difficulties with determining violations the standards adopted" to control interstate
waters. 53
The Clean Water Act as we know it today was enacted in 1972.5 This 1972 revision of the old Federal
Water Pollution Control Act was designed to provide incentives to encourage individuals and industry to reduce
and control the amount of water pollution they produced.5 Through the CWA's statutory regulation. the
government seeks to return the Nation's waters to their '"chemical. physical, and biological integrity" and
maintain this level of purity. 6 The 1965 version of the Act was significantly revised because of the adoption of
the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES"), which replaced the River and Harbors Act
permit system.5 7

4433

U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000).

Jason R. Jones, The Clean Water Act: Grounchrater Regulation and the Naional Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. 8 Dick. J.
Envtl. L. & Pol'y 93, 96 (1999). See also N. William Hines. Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality. 52 Iowa L.

Rev. 799, 803 (1967).
Jones, supra note 45, at 96.

46
47
4 id.

id.

49 id.

s Id.
"Id.
3

Id. at 96-97.

Id. at 97. See also generally 33 U.S.C § 1251 (2000).
Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Albert J. Thomas. III. The Federal/Arkansas Wauter Pollution Control Programs: Past. Present, and Future.
23 U. Ark. Little Rock L. Rev. 541. 588 (2001). See also Bridget B. Romero. Note. Is There a Need to Regluate .ussel Harvesting?
The Ninth Circuit Declares No Pollution, No Problem!. 10 Mo. ENvTI.. L. & Pol.'Y RIv. 158. 160 (2003).
5 Wright & Thomas. supra note 54. at 590.
36 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2000). See also Romero. Note. supra note 54. at 160.
37 Jones, supra note 45. at 97.
'

5
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B. NPDES Permitsand WQLS Lisis
The primary regulatory mechanism of the CWA is the NPDES.5 This system requires permits be issued
in order to legally discharge any pollutants. The agency primarily responsible for the implementation and
enforcement of NPDES programs is the EPA 60 however, the EPA is permitted to relinquish this authority to the
state itself.61 Under the CWA. every state must designate and categorize all "bodies of water" 62 in its territories
and set appropriate water quality standards based u on their designated uses.
Additionally, if a party
discharges a pollutant from a discrete "point source,"6 that party must obtain a NPDES permit from the EPA
(or another approved state agency) specifying the precise amount of discharge allowed. If a discharge occurs
in violation of a NPDES permit. it is deemed unlawful. 66 This is significant since the EPA can "delegate the
NPDES program" to individual states. 67 In effect. this causes the amount of pollution required to violate a
NPDES permit to vary from state to state.68 The issue arises in that all the government need show to prove a
CWA violation is that a permit holder violated the terms of the NPDES permit.69 So an individual state could
set its standards below what the EPA would have, and a CWA violation can still occur. In turn, this means that
if a party is complying with its NPDES permit., it is not violating the CWA. 70
If the pollution is originating from a "diffuse, 'non-point' source," 7 it renders the water quality
standards unattainable by use of the NPDES permits alone. 72 These bodies of water are referred to as WQLS,
See 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

Id.at § 1342(a)(1).
""Id.

d. at § 1342(b).
The EPA defines "waters of the United States" as follows:
(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past. or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign
commerce. including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide:
(b) All interstate waters, including interstate "wetlands;'
(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sand flats,
"wetlands." sloughs. prairie potholes. wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds the use degradation, or destruction
of which would affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(I) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes;
(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate commerce; or
(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;
(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under this definition;
(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through (d)of this definition;
(f) The territorial sea: and
(a) "Wetlands' adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)
through (f) of this definition.
40 C.F.R. 122.2 (2004).
Sierra Club v. Hankinson. 351 F.3d 1358. 1359-60 (1 Ith Cir. 2003). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(c).
" "Point source" is defined as "any discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including but
not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel. tunnel. conduit. well. discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate
collection system. vessel or other floating craft. from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33 U.S.C. 4 1362(14). See also 40
C.F.R. s 12.2. "The definition of a point source is to be broadly interpreted, and an entire facility may be a point source." Jones,
supra note 45. at n.28 (quoting 14illians Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1319 (S.D. Iowa 1997)).
65
Sierra Club. 351 F.3d at 1360. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1342.

"33 U. S.C. § 1311(a).
Romero. Note. supra note 54. at 162.

67

68 Id.

U.S.C. § 1319(b), (d).
Romero. Note. supra note 54. at 162.
7' A "non-point source" has been defined as "one that does
not confine its polluting discharge to one fairly specific outlet, such as a
sewer pipe. a drainage ditch or a conduit." S. REP. No. 414, at 98-99 (1971).
6933
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and for each of these the state must establish a TMDL.7 3 The TMDL "'specifies the highest level of each
pollutant that may pass-' into the body of water each day.7 Each state is expected to establish TMDLs b using
-appropriately stringent point source permits" and various other measures to control non-point sources. The
EPA has the responsibility of making sure that each state develops WQLS lists and TMDLs, as well as,
approving each state's WQLS list and TMDLs.'7 Furthermore. if a state fails to fulfill these duties as required
under the CWA. the EPA becomes the responsible party for the initial creation and enforcement of the WQLS
list and TMDLs. '
(.

ee-shifliing Provisions

The fee-shifting prov ision of the CWA states that a court may award costs of litigation "to any
prevailing or substantially prevailing part\ whenever the court determines that such an award is appropriate."
]'here are essentially two elements that the court must find present in order to award the costs of litigation.79
First. the court must determine whether an award for litigation costs to the substantially prevailing party
is "appropriate.- 8" The Supreme Court has defined "appropriate" as ",specially suitable, fit, or proper" by using
the definition from Webster's dictionary.8'
The Supreme Court has stated that such an award is only
appropriate -when a part\ has prevailed. substantially prevailed. or been successful." 82 The First Circuit has
found that the lInguage **whene\ er appropriate~ gives the court -great judicial latitude in awarding fees .. ."83
That court reasoned that **the purpose of an award of costs and fees ... is to allocate the costs and litigation
equitably. to encourage the achievement of statutory goals."8 4 The "appropriate" element is not much of a
barrier to an award of litigation costs since most courts generally award such fees as long as a party has
substantiall\ prevailed.
The second element states that a party must be the prevailing party or substantially prevailing party. 86
The Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of who is a prevailing party in a lawsuit many times.87 In 1980, the
Supreme Court held that a part\ need not go to trial to receive a favorable judgment. and has noted that a
Sierra Club

Ilankinson. 351 .3 I 5X.

1360

I Ith Cir. 2003).

Ul.

hi

Ui See alvo Sierra Club %NL'ihLurg20'6 F.3d F 102
.M-2-7 Ith Cir. 2002).
'33 .S.C. 1365(d) (20(10)
Jason Douglas Klin. lus
\ / cc mno
nd the <cun 11aler .*l/t alier Buckhannon. 9 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & Pot'Y 109,
II 1-12 (2003).
Id. at 116.
Ruckelshaus 1. Sierra Club. 463 t.S. 680. 683 11983) (quoting WVIlisTR's TIRI)NEW" INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 106 (1976)).
Klein. supra note 79. at 116. (quotinU Ruckelshno.. 463 U.S. at 683).
Id. (citinu Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc.. x. EPA. 484 F.2d 1331. 1338 (Ist Cir. 1973)).
. (quotingV atuiralRes. De. 484 F.2d at 1338).
Id. at 115.
""See id. at I 1l.
See Alan Hirsch & Diane Sheehe%. .hardin .Anorners' Fees and Managing Fee Litigation. at 7-12 (1994), available at

http: 'www.fic.gov neww-ebjnetweb.nsfautoframeopenform&url r-pages!556&url I=index (discussing generally the cases decided
through 1994. by the Supreme Court relating to attorney fees and the issue of who is the prevailing party).
* Maher v. Gagne. 448 U.S 122. 129 (1980). In laher. the respondent filed a complaint "alleging that Connecticut's Aid to Families
with Dependent Children regulations denied her credit for substantial portions of her actual work-related expenses." Id. at 125. The
court held that despite the fact that the plaintiff prevailed by settlement rather than through litigation did not "weaken her claim to
fees." Id. at 129. The court stated that -'for purposes of the award of counsel fees. parties may be considered to have prevailed when
the\ vindicate rights through a consent .judgment or without formallv obtainine relief." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 5 (1976)).
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consent decree or settlement was enough to fulfill the "prevailing" requirement." In the 1987 Supreme Court
case of Hewitt v. Helms, 90 the Court held that a prevailing party is one that wins judgment on at least some of its

claims.91
In 1988, the Fourth Circuit stated in National Wildlife Federationv. Hanson92 that it should interpret the
term "'prevailing' in light of the goals of the Clean Water Act' in environmental litigation." It reasoned that to
do otherwise would be to frustrate the legislative intent of awarding fees." The court noted that the legislative
history of the fee shifting provisions "indicates that they were enacted to encourage litigation and ensure proper
administrative implementation of environmental statutes."9 Furthermore. the court stated that in environmental
suits the plaintiffs obtain no financial benefit or vindication of personal rights as one in a civil suit would. '6
Then, in 1992, the Farrarv. Hobby97 Court held that the award of nominal damages wvas enough to
consider a party prevailing.98 However, that Court also stated that the amount of nominal damages could have a
direct bearing on the amount of attorneys' fees awarded under the fee shifting provision.
Before 1994, there was another theory upon which a party could be determined to be prevailing: the
"catalyst theory." 00 Under this theory. a party could prevail "even if it did not obtain judgment on the merits.**
if the suit acted as the "catalyst" for a change in defendant's behavior.'" With the "catalyst theory." a mere
change in a defendant's behavior stemming from a plaintiffs suit was enough to consider plaintiff a prevailing
party.
Then, in 2001, under Buckhannon Board & Care Home. Inc. v. 11'esi Uirginia Department of Health &
Human Resources,102 the Supreme Court gave clear meaning to the term "prevailing party.'" 10 The Court stated
See also Robin Stanley, Buckhannon Board and Care Home. Inc. v. West I irginia Departuent of Health and Human Resources: To
the Prevailing Party goes the Spoils .. and the .4tornevs Fees.. 36 AKRON L. Ri v. 363. 372 (2003 1.

Maher. 448 U.S. at 129.
9482 U.S. 755 (1987).
9' Id. at 760-61 (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton. 446 U.S. 754. 757 (1980n.

92859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1988).
9 Id. at 316 (applying Hanrahan. 446 U.S. 754). See Conservation La\\ Found. \. Sec'\ of the Interior. 7NO F.2d 965. 967-68 (1st

Cir. 1986).
94
Hanson, 859 F.2d at 316.
9 Id. at 316-17.
96Id. at 317.

9 506 U.S. 103 (1992). In this case. the plaintiff sued for monetary and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985. Id. at 106.
The court found that Hobby had committed an act or acts under color of state law%that deprived plaintiff of a civil right. and yet.
Hobby's conduct was not a proximate cause of any damages suffered b\ the plaintiff and that each part\ bear their own costs. 1I. at
106-07. Since Hobby had deprived Farrar of a civil right. Farrar was entitled to nominal damages. I. at 107. Farrar then sought
attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. Id The Supreme Court held that to qualify as a prevailing part\. the plaintiff in a civil case
must obtain at least some relief on the merits against the defendant as %%ell as an enforceable judgment (or consent decree) against that
defendant. Id. at 11l. "In civil rights litigation. only those circumstances that materially affect the legal relationship of the parties by
modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff. can transform the plaintiff into a prevailing party.Stanley, supra note 88, at note 55 (citing Farrar. 506 U.S. at 111-12 (internal quotations omitted)).
" Id. at 114.

9 Id.
'0 Stanley, supra note 88 at 375-76.

0' Id. at 376. To be considered a -catalvst'

there were three conditions that must be satisfied if there was not a final judgment or

consent decree: (I) plaintiff had to show that defendant supplied some of the relief for \%hich plaintiff sought in bringing the suit: (2)

plaintiff must demonstrate that the claim %\asnot -*frivolous. unreasonable. or groundless:- and (3) plaintitmust establish that its suit
was a "substantial cause" or a "significant catalyst" in the defendants providing relief. Al at n. 10 (quoting Wheeler v. Towanda Area

Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1991) (--some of the benefit sou-ht*'). Grano \. Barry. 783 F.2d 1104. 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("frivolous, unreasonable or groundless'). and Williams v. Leatherbur. 672 F.2d 549. 551 (5th Cir. 1982) ("substantial. significant
catalyst")).
102
532 U.S. 598 (2001).
103 Id. at

610. See also Stanley. supra note 88. at 389.
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that a prevailing party is a party that has received at least some relief on the merits of his claims by a settlement
forced through a consent decree or a judgment on the merits.
In that case, the Justices adhered to the current
trend of the court to interpret terms using legal dictionaries.10 This new bright line rule has quashed much of
the ability of the district courts to use discretion in awarding litigation costs.' 0
IV. INSTANT DECISION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's award of fees
to plaintiffs for non-testifying expert witnesses.10 7 The expert's fees amassed after litigation had technically
come to end, in that the expert was to monitor the already established consent decree to assure compliance by

the EPA.'08 The Eleventh Circuit evaluated three issues on appeal that were brought into question by the EPA.

The EPA first argued that the district court's award of fees was for work done by the expert was beyond

"reasonably necessary to monitor compliance with the consent decree" under Sierra Club v. Meiburg 09
According to the EPA, the Meiburg case only required them to establish TMDLs in some form." 0 The EPA
claimed that the plaintiffs should be allowed to recover costs associated with determining -whether the . . .
[EPA] promulgated standards," but not to monitor the standards in any detail."' In essence. the EPA claimed
that the plaintiffs only needed to establish the content of the TMDLs and assess their validity to assure that the
EPA has fulfilled its obligations."l 2
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, and stated that its holding in Meiburg "simply noted that
implementation plans were not mentioned within the definition of TMDL.

. .

. EPA obligations. or anywhere

within the consent decree.""13 The consent decree in the instant case requires that "each stage of TMDL
proposals by the EPA relate[] to a new WQLS list promulgated by the state of Georgia. making review of the
underlying WQLS lists essential to monitoring the TMDLs themselves."" 4 The court agreed with the district
court's decision that the "examination of the content of the TMDLs, WQLS lists and [Performance Partnership
Agreements ("PPAs")] was 'necessary to meaningful enforcement of the Consent Decree."' 1 Additionally.
using the standard set in Brooks v. Georgia State Board of Elections," 6 the court of appeals held that the
information in the consent decree appeared "'relevant to those rights' established by the decree and *related to
terms of the judgment."' 7
Second, the EPA's contended that since the consent decree reserved plaintiffs the right to contest
TMDLs in the future, it implied that the consent decree covered only the -existence of the standards rather than
Id. The court noted that "[i]n addition to judgments on the merits. we have held that settlement agreements enforced through a
consent decree may serve as the basis for an award of attorney's fees.- Id. at 604.
20 Stanley, supra note 88 at 389-90 (citing Buckhannon. 532 U.S. at 603). The dictionaries are used for words that are -tailored for
judicial settings." Buckhannon. 532 U.S. at 616.
06 Stanley, supra note 88 at. 390-9 1.
07Sierra Club v. Hankinson. 351 F.3d 1358. 1359 (11 th Cir. 2003).
o Id.
' 296 F.3d 1021, 1030 (1
Ith Cir. 2001).
"o Sierra Club, 351 F.3d at 1361.
"11 Id.

"2 Id. (citing Meiburg, 296 F.3d at 1030).
"3 Id. "Infact. the decree explicitly states the EPA 'does not obligate itself to perform. or ensure the performance of the
incorporation of TMDLs into future Georgia/EPA Performance Partnership Agreements." Id.
224 Id. at 1362.
25 Id.
26

997 F.2d 857, 864 (1ith Cir. 1993). The court held that post judgment monitoring of a consent decree
must be -relevant to the
rifhts established by the decree and related to the terms of the judgment." Id.
" Sierra Club. 351 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Brooks. 997 F.2d at 864).
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their compliance with applicable laws." I It further claimed that all future challenges to TMDLs would then
require separate issues and new administrative records since such challenges would be to TMDLs other than the
TMDLs referred to in the consent decree.'II
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. holding that the mere possibility of future, separate TMDL challenges
would not necessarily imply that all the issues relating to such TMDLs would have to be litigated separately.1 20
The court reasoned that if the plaintiffs had
discovered that certain TMDL standards were so patently inadequate that they did not
meaningfully implement the consent decree., the plaintiffs could have returned to the district
court and requested enforcement.' 2' Given that the consent decree granted the court jurisdiction
to issue orders necessary or appropriate to construe, implement, modify, or enforce the decree,
and given that the court found review of TMDL content necessary to meaningful enforcement,
the district court might have considered such an action to be within the terms of the decree.' 22
The final issue raised by the EPA was that the relevant provision regarding the attorneys' fees does not
cover fees of non-testifying expert witnesses. [13 The EPA reasoned that under the language of the CWA, "a
court *may award costs of litigation(including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or
substantially prevailing party. whenever the court determines such award is appropriate."' 24 Since the district
court had awarded expert witness fees to the plaintiffs because the "litigation had been especially complex and
that [the expert] had helped plaintiffs prevail." the EPA argued that the expert did not help the plaintiffs prevail.
In fact. the expert only monitored the established consent decree, which was after litigation was complete and
the plaintiffs had won. 12 5
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the EPA's argument by saying that "[w]hile the word [prevail] may
not have been entirely accurate, the plaintiffs are still prevailing or substantially prevailing within the context of
monitoring an environmental consent decree."1 26 Quoting the Fourth Circuit in National Wildlife Federationv.
Hanson'27 the court explained.
if we do not interpret "prevailing" in light of the goals of [CWA], the legislative purpose in
awarding fees will be frustrated. The legislative history of the fee shifting provisions indicates
that they were enacted to encourage litigation to ensure proper administrative implementation of
the environmental statutes. Both the Clean Air Act and [] [CWA] authorize a court to award fees
whenever it determines that such award is appropriate ... Unlike the plaintiffs in traditional civil
actions. plaintiffs in environmental suits do not seek to vindicate personal rights and they obtain
no financial benefit if they win."s
The court then went on to mention that none of the cases cited by the EPA in support of its position involved the
"monitoring of a post-judgment consent decree."1 29 The court then noted that the Sierra Club v. EPA case

12" Id.
Id.

124 Id.

(emphasis added). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000).

125Id. (internal quotations omitted).
126Id. (internal quotations omitted).
121859 F.2d 313 (4th Cir.
2

1988).
Sierra Club. 351 F.3d at 1362-63 (quoting Hanson, 859 F.2d at 316-17).

' Id. at 1363. The court only mentioned one of these cases in its opinion, Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In that case, the D.C. Circuit denied expert witness fees for a "technical consultant who had assisted the attorneys in preparing a
general challenge to Clean Air Act regulations.~ Sierra Clib. 351 F.3d at 1363 (internal quotations omitted).
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predated Delaware Valley. which is the -key Supreme Court case establishing the intimate connection between
initial litigation and the post-judgment monitoring of a consent decree.".130 In that case, the plaintiffs had to
modify a consent decree several times. and the court found the defendant in violation twice. 13 1 "The
plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provisions of the Clean Air Act." 32 The defendant
objected to costs for time spent monitoring the consent decree.' 33 The Supreme Court rejected this argument
and noted that *'Congress enacted the fee-shifting provision in order to -encourage citizen participation in the
enforcement of standards and regulations established under this Act. ...134
The Eleventh Circuit noted the similarities between the Delawiare Valley case and the instant case such
as the -detailed instructions as to how the program was to be developed and the specific dates . . . [the] tasks
The court also noted that Delaware Valley "required significant post-judgment
were to be accomplished.-"
The court recognized
monitoring in order to protect the relief afforded plaintiffs through the consent decree."'
by the district
ordered
the
remedy
enforce
to
necessary
-measures
that
observation
court's
i
allev
the Delaiware
court cannot be divorced from the matters upon which [the plaintiffs] prevailed in securing the consent
.)ust as the Supreme Court in Delaware Fallei. the Eleventh Circuit used a pragmatic test instead of
decree.'
a technical test in construing the attorneys* fees statute by placing more emphasis on the "nature of the rights
secured by the consent decree and the measures necessary to secure those rights than on the technical definition
of litigation costs.
Since the instant case required a highl\ technical post-judgment monitoring of the TMDLs take place,
because there \\as no evidentiar\ hearing in which the expert could have testified, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded there \as no abuse of discretion on the part of the district court in awarding the non-testifying expert
As such. the LleXenth Circuit affirmed the district court's award of post-judgment monitoring
witness's fees.
fees. 4
V. COMMVE\T

The Eleventh Circuit's holding in the instant case. while one of first impression. is consistent with other
decisions involving awards of attorne\ s' fees and litigation costs resulting from CWA litigation. All of these
decisions point toward a polic\ of remoing!the disincentives from environmental suits in an effort to encourage
citizens to report and litigate en-ironmental harms. To do this. courts seem willing to award any reasonable
fees or costs louically related to the cause of action. or enforcement resulting from that cause of action.
In the instant case. the LEleventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs were the substantially prevailing party
in the litigation. ' The court then set out to determine if a non-testifying expert witness who only participates
in the post-judgment monitoring of the consent decree could be considered as helping a party prevail. 42 The
Sierra ( lub. 35 1 F.3d at 1363.
AL (citinu P1a. \. Del. Valle\ Citizen,* Council. 478 L .S.

Seei~. 42 L.S.C.

546.

549-53 (1986)).

-7604t di12000).

i.
Sierra ( Td-. 3511 .Sd at 1363 iquoting Dci. Iallc. 478 U.S. at 560).
A.
h/. at 1364.
141. (quoting Dell alle . 478 U.S. at 559).
138 li. (quoting Del I a//ev. 478 1 .S. at 559) (internal quotations omitted). See also Brooks v. Ga. State Bd. of Elections, 997 F.2d

857. 863 (1 Ith Cir. 1993).
'Sierra ( lub. 351 3F.d at I364.

-

li at 1362-63.
hi.
A. at 1361.
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Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court in Delaware Valley that "measures necessary to enforce the
remedy ordered . . . cannot be divorced from the matters upon which [plaintiffs] prevailed in securing the
consent decree."
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the award of the expert witness fees to the plaintiffs because
"protection of the rights enshrined in the consent decree depend[] upon highly technical. post-judgment
monitoring and evaluation . . . . *144 This was consistent with the Delaware Valley case. which dealt with
attorneys' fees resulting from administrative proceedings, not literal judicial actions."': That court reasoned that
the work performed by counsel in the non-judicial phases was "necessary to the attainment of adequate relief. .
"46 "Protection of the full scope of relief afforded by the consent decree . . . [is] crucial to safeguard
the
[plaintiff s] interests .... "
In such a case. the plaintiff must continue to monitor the defendant in order to
assure that the defendant is complying with the consent decree. This is especially important in cases where a
consent decree calls for continuing decreases in the level of pollution. Put simply. the monitoring of a consent
decree is necessary to enforce its effect. If a plaintiff cannot monitor a defendant's compliance with a decree
due to an inability to pay for such monitoring. then the basic purpose of consent decree would be severely
undermined.
In Earth Island Institute, Inc.. v. Southern Califbrnia Edison. Co..1" the court noted the minute amount
of case law regarding attorneys' fees under the CWA.149 As such. the Delawtare Icdlev court adopted standards
used in civil rights cases in order to decide whether or not to award attorneys' fees and costs.'5 Fees awarded
for the post-judgment monitoring of a consent decree are considered a compensable activity inder the context
of the Civil Rights Act of 1976.'5' While the Clean Air Act authorizes an award of fees in any "action." the
Civil Rights Act allows them in any "action or proceeding."
The Delaware cdlev court held that that
distinction was not a "sufficient indication that Congress intended . . . [the Clean Air Act] to apply only to
judicial, and not administrative, proceedings.-'
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Act is very similar
in purpose as to that of the Clean Water Act. The enforcement of the Civil Rights Act is largely dependent
upon the efforts of private citizens.15 "[U]nless reasonable attorney's fees could be axarded for bringing
[civil rights] actions, Congress found that many legitimate claims w\ould not be redressed."'
This is
essentially the same reasoning used in the fee shifting provision of the CWA. where. the legislative history
dictates that the statute was designed to "encourage litigation to ensure the proper administrative
implementation of the environmental statutes."'; 6 This is also the reasoning behind the Clean Air Act statute in
Delaware Valley: "Congress enacted § 304 [of the Clean Air Act] specifically to encourage citizen participation
in the enforcement of standards and regulations established under this Act."'' That Senate Report. which was
also cited in Delaware Valley. urged courts to "recognize that in bringing leeitimate actions . .. citizens would
be performing a public service and in such instances the courts should awlard costs of litigation to such

143 Id. at 1364 (quoting Pa. v. Del. Valle\ Citizens' Council. 478 U.S. 546. 559 11086n.
4
14

'
47

Id.
Del. Valley, 478

U.S.

at 558.

1

Id.

14

838 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Id. at 465. n.6.

149
1s0

Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 559.

"' Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
1

Id.

153

Id.

54

Id. at 560. See also S. RiP. No. 94- 01 l. at 2 (1976). H.R. RI;P. No. 94-155s.
at 1 (1976).
Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 560 (citing H.R. Ri;P. No. 94-1558. at Ii.
156Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 351 F.3d
1358. 1362-63 ( I Ith Cir. 2003).
15 Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 560 (citing S. RiP. No. 91-1196. at 36 (1970))
(internal quotations omitted).
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party."' By analogizing to civil rights and environmental statutes, "the Court suggested that the purposes of
59
each w[ere] sufficiently similar 'to interpret both provisions governing attorney's fees in the same manner.""
The Delaware Valley Court reasoned that the analysis of the legislative histories of each supplied backing for
such an interpretation. 6 0
With this legislative history and reasoning in mind, the court's decision in the instant case seems
extremely logical. There is generally no financial award for a plaintiff in an environmental case, and as such.
there is a need for the financial burdens of pursuing such a case to be reduced. As in the Delaware Valley case.
the post-judgment monitoring in the instant case was "'useful and of a type ordinarily necessary' to secure the
final result obtained from the litigation."' 6 i In 2000, in another Earth Islandv. Southern California Edison Co.
case, the court allowed the plaintiffs to collect attorneys' fees for post judgment monitoring of a consent decree
that accrued for eight years after the decree was put into action.1 62 The court in that case found that the
plaintiffs' continued monitoring of the area at issue was "necessary to the resolution of th[e] litigation and [was]
closely linked to the Plaintiffs' litigation interests."' 6 3
It seems that who it is doing the post-judgment monitoring for the prevailing party is not of great
concern to the courts as long as what that person is doing is not illogical and the cost is not unreasonable. In the
instant case, it was a non-testifying expert witness, rather than of a member of the party. who filed the suit or
was privy to the consent decree.'6 The court interpreted the language of the statute very broadly and liberally
in an effort to obtain a result in accordance with the congressional intent. It clearly stated that, regarding
attorneys' fees, the term "prevailing" does not limit the award to merely those who helped the plaintiff obtain a
judgment or a consent decree, but allows an award for the cost of those who also help enforce the judgment or
consent decree.' 65 The Eleventh Circuit was concerned with the protection of the rights that the consent decree
gave the plaintiffs.' 66 It stated that due to the "highly technical" nature of the post-judgment monitoring of the
plaintiffs consent decree, and because there was no evidentiary hearing that afforded the expert witness to
testify as to his importance of his involvement in enforcement of the consent decree. that it could not say the
district abused its discretion in awarding these expert witness fees.i 67 The court's goal is to make citizen
enforcers feel "welcome[] as participants in the enforcement process to the extent that fee awards compensate
them for all of their time and expenses spent on the types of activities that are ordinarily necessary to secure the
final result obtained from the litigation."16 8 "This includes not only attorneys' fees incurred in actual litigation.

158Id. (quoting

S.REP. No. 91-1196, at 38).

"9 J. Douglas Klein, Note, Does Buckhannon Appli? An Analysis of Judicial Application and Extension of the Supreme Court
Decision Eighteen Months After and Beyond. 13 DUKE ENvrL. L & PoL'Y F. 99. 130 (2002) (quoting Del. aller. 478 U.S. at 560).

Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 559 (explaining that the purposes behind both legislative histories are -nearly identical.- which provides
support for the idea that they should be interpreted similarly).
161Del. Valley, 478 U.S. at 561 (quoting Webb v. Bd. of Educ.. 471 U.S. 234. 243 (1985)).
162Earth Island Inst., Inc., v. S. Cal. Edison Co.. 92 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (S.D. Cal. 2000). In this Federal Water Pollution Control
Act
case, plaintiffs filed for an application for an award of supplemental attorney fees and costs for post-judgment monitoring work under
33 U.S.C. 1365(d). Id. at 1062. The court found that the continuous monitoring was done to ensure compliance with the consent
decree. Id. at 1064. As such. the court awarded the Plaintiff s motion and the award of attorney's fees and costs were granted. Id. at
1066.
'6

161Id. at 1064.
164Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 351 F.3d
165Id. at 1362-63 (citing Nat'l Wildlife

1358. 1359 (11 th Cir. 2003).
Fed'n v. Hanson. 859 F.2d 313. 316-17 (4th Cir. 1988)).

1 Sierra Club. 351 F.3d at 1364.
167id.

'

Adam Babich, The Wages of Sin: The Iiolator-Pas Rule fir Environmental Citi:en Suits. 10 WNli M iR L Snil'. J. 219. 254

(2003) (internal quotations omitted).
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but fees for paralegals or law students.16 9 research and preparation.170 travel,' 7' consultation with clients, experts
and other attorneys. 72 and working - as appropriate to pursue the client's goals - with the media."' 73 Awards
of fees and costs have also been awarded for 'long-distance phone calls, photocopying service and express mail
charges174 computer assisted research," 17 and most importantly for this comment, expert consultants.176 This,
"9 See Missouri v. Jenkins. 491 U.S. 274. 285 (1989) (considering the term "reasonable attorney's fee" to mean the work of "others
whose labor contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her client .. . including "work not only of attorneys, but also
of secretaries. messengers. librarians, janitors, and others whose labor contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her
client"') and Atl. States Legal Found.. Inc. v. Universal Tool & Stamping Co., 798 F. Supp. 522, 527 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (allowing award
for a third-year law student to be billed at $75.00 per hour). (Adapted from Babich, supra note 168 at 255-58).
1o See Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att'y Gen.. 297 F.3d 253. 269 (3d Cir. 2002) (awarding fees in conjunction with "121
hours for preparation for the oral argument for the merits appeal, [i]nclud[ing] . . . 25.5 hours of moot court time and 4.5 hours of
observing oral argument") and James v. Norton. 176 F. Supp. 2d 385, 397 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (awarding fees for plaintiffs counsel for
time spent researching and drafting a response to defendants motion in limine even though said response was never filed). (Adapted
from Babich. supra note 168 at 255-58).
1 See Planned Parenthood. 297 F.3d at 267 (allowing attorney fees associated with travel time when it is customary
in the local
community to bill clients for such charges): Ramos v. Lamm, 713 F.2d 546, 559 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'don other grounds (disallowing
fees for travel expenses between the local area and the outside counsel's area when there is no need to retain such counsel); and Atl.
States. 798 F. Supp. at 529 (holding that defendant need not pay the extra cost of travel of an attorney from New York that plaintiff
chose to represent it in Indiana). (Adapted from Babich, supra note 168 at 255-58).
2 Compare Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 860 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that "time spent by two attorneys on

the same general task is not . . . per se duplicative . . . [because] careful preparation often requires collaboration and rehearsal"), Delph

v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.. 130 F.3d 349. 358-59 (8th Cir. 1997) (The court was uncomfortable with the fact that plaintiff had three
counsel. one local and two trial. The court focused on the fact that the second trial counsel billed out only 62 hours versus lead trial
counsel's 325 hours. that he actively participated in the trial, and that none of the work seemed duplicative of lead counsel, in holding
that the fee was proper.) and At. States, 798 F. Supp. at 528 ("[J]ustifiable instances of having two attorneys present . . . are not
considered duplicative by the court. It is not uncommon, especially in complex litigation, to have more than one attorney present in
the courtroom.") (internal quotations omitted) with Pub. Int. Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Widnall, 42 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1117. 1121 (D.N.J. 1995). available at 1995 WL 836144 (holding "that the extraordinary of time expended on [internal] consultation
was unnecessary and unproductive"). (Adapted from Babich, supra note 168, at 255-58).
17 Compare Davis i San Francisco. 976 F.2d 1536. 1545 (9th Cir. 1992) (allowing an award of attorney fees for giving
press
conferences. lobbying, and other public relations work where such work is "directly and intimately related to the successful
representation of a client" reasoning that private attorneys who do such work bill their clients, so prevailing civil rights parties may do
the same). vacated in part on other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993) with Halderman v. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d
939. 941-42 (3d Cir. 1995) (disallowing fee award for "time spent on public relations efforts" reasoning that simply because "private
lawyers may perform tasks other than legal services for their clients, with their consent and approval, does not justify foisting off such
expenses on an adversary under the guise of reimbursable legal fees"). (Adapted from Babich, supra note 168 at 255-58).
"' See Martin v. City of Indianapolis. 28 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (S.D. Ind. 1998) (stating that "some of the costs listed by [plaintiffs]
counsel. including travel expenses. long-distance telephone calls, photocopying services and express mail charges, are more properly
labeled 'litigation expenses.' which generally are compensable as part of a reasonable attorney's fee, rather than costs") and Kersch v.
Bd. of County Comm'r.. 851 F. Supp. 1541. 1545 (D. Wyo. 1994) (allowing an award of costs for "deposition transcripts, travel
expenses in connection with depositions and the contempt hearing, postage, and long distance telephone charges"). (Adapted from
Babich. supra note 168 at 255-58).
1 See In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig.. 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting attorney's request for expenses
associated with computerized legal research). But see Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV Sch. Dist., 5 F.3d 319, -325 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that "computer-based legal research must be factored into the attorneys' hourly rate, hence the cost of the computer time may
not be added to the fee award"). (Adapted from Babich, supra note 168 at 255-58).
116See Hitchcock v. G & W Elec. Co., No. 85-C0067, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 5, 1989) (awarding costs for an
expert consultant who was retained to "to assist in evaluating settlement proposals, analyze the cost of replacement health insurance
for class members, and assist in analyzing the class members' documents to determine their recovery in . . . [a] relatively complicated
benefits litigation"), AtI. States Leg. Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 38 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1426, 1429,
available at, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6071 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (awarding fees for "services of plaintiffs expert ... [where] affidavits
adequately show that the services . . . were provided in . . . expert-witness capacity" and the case settled before trial on the merits

hence it was unlikely that expert testified): and Proffitt v. Mun. Auth. of the Borough of Morrisville, 716 F. Supp. 845, 859 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (allowing an award of costs for experts who did not testify and whose proposed "testimony was ultimately not necessary given
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coupled with the fact that awards have been made for costs and fees incurred in administrative hearings, 7 7 and
post-judgment monitoring and enforcement.17 8 leads to the sensible conclusion that resulted in the instant case:
a court will allow an expert witness's fees incurred in the post-judgment monitoring of a consent decree, to be
awarded to the prevailing party since the post-judgment monitoring is an intricate part of a suit.
It seems very fair and reasonable for the courts to allow so many diverse fees and costs in light of the
fact that the plaintiffs in environmental suits can very rarely obtain any financial benefit. Lawyers are less
likely to help citizens in such cases due to the risk of loss on a contingency fee. Additionally, most people and
organizations are unable to afford the hourly costs of such litigation. 79 The breadth of the holdings in the
aforementioned cases allow\ citizens to bring meritorious claims. and for attorneys to help them litigate these
claims. to ensure the preservation ol our limited environment by slowing its destruction.
VI. CONCLLSION

The Eleventh Circuit's holding in Sierra Club v. Hankinson clearly furthers the government's desire for
average everyday citizens to assist in the policing and enforcement of our environmental laws. The government
is continually disposing of disincentives standing in the way of citizens attempting to enforce these laws. In this
instance. the court furthered this goal b\ once again broadening the law regarding what circumstances a
prevailing party may be awarded cost and fees resulting from litigation. Here, the court extended this right to a
party whose only involvement in the suit occurred after the consent decree was established. In doing this, the
court is sending a strong message that an\ reasonable and logical costs and fees related to the prevailing party's
litigation and enforcement procedures \\ill be recoverable as litigation costs, so that ordinary citizens can help
preserve our precious environment.
C. TRAVIS HARGROVE

the settlement of the case. oecause -their testimoion\ would have been indispensable to the case had it gone to trial"), aff'd, 897 F.2d
523 (3d Cir. 1990). Bi see Sierra Club \. EPA. 769 F.2d 796. 812 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (denying an award of costs for a "technical

consultantC who helped in preparing petitioners case stating that it did not consider the consultant an expert because "review of the
regulations 1lerel undertaken ... on the adninistrative record without any new hearings before this or any other court" and expert
consulting sern ices -do not fall under the traditional concept of costs-'). (Adapted from Babich, supra note 168 at 255-58).
Compare Sullitan . Hudson. 490 U.S. 877. 888 (1989) (holding that -where administrative proceedings are intimately tied to the
resolution of the judicial action and necessar\ to the attainment of the results Congress sought to promote by providing for fees, they
should be considered part and parcel of the action for which fees may be awarded.**) and Pa. v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for
Clean Air. 478 U.S. 546. 561 (1986) (aw\arding costs incurred in administrative proceedings by holding that participation in
administrathe proceedings that were **crucial to the vindication of Delaware Valley's rights under the consent decree and . . .
compensation for these activities was entirely proper and well within the 'zone of discretion' afforded the [d]istrict [clourt") with
Mich. v. EPA. 254 F.3d 1087. 1091 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the language of the Clean Air Act § 307(f) "requires awards only
for 'costs of litigation.- so --fees incurred in the preparation of an administrative petition . . . [would be] excluded). (Adapted from
Babich. supra note 168 at 255-58).
78 See. e.g.. De/. IVallev. 478 U.S. at 559 (stating that "[sjeveral courts have held that . . . post-judgment monitoring of a consent
decree is a compensable activity for which counsel is entitled to a reasonable fee") and Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir.
1989) (awarding plaintiff the fees incurred from a "special master** who monitored the consent decree to assure defendant's
compliance). (Adapted from Bahich. supra note 168 at 255-58).
' Babich. supra note 168. at 259.
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